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Introduction 
Germany celebrates two important 50-year anniversaries in the year 2005. On May 9, 1955, the 
Federal Republic of Germany became the 15th member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), signaling that the country was ready to be considered an equal partner in the common 
defense of the Western Alliance. November 12, 1955 is the founding day of the German 
Bundeswehr when the first 101 members of Germany’s new armed forces received their letters of 
appointment from the new Minister of Defense Theodor Blank in an old vehicle warehouse in 
Bonn.  
This paper describes the important role that the concept of “Innere Führung”[1] has had, and 
continues to have, in the armed forces of Germany. It will first give a brief account of events and 
circumstances that preceded the inception of the post-World War II German armed forces. The 
paper then will outline the idea and underlying philosophy of Innere Führung in the context of 
civil-military relations theory by examining the importance of values and legitimacy as it relates to 
its distinguishing feature of the “citizen in uniform.” It will chart the objectives of Innere Führung 
and their application on both the institutional and the individual level in order to address the 
proper balance between the functions of the armed forces on one hand and the values of society 
as a whole on the other. The paper will conclude that this 50-year-old concept is still valid today, 
that its dynamic characteristics have allowed it to respond appropriately to developments in civil 
society, and that it may well serve as a model for emerging democracies facing the challenges of 
civil-military tensions.  
The Road to Rearmament 
While the Bundeswehr can look back on a successful 50 year history, the road to German 
rearmament and the founding of its current armed forces was not an easy one. In 1949, the 
western part of Germany had adopted a new constitution (Basic Law) that did not contain any 
provision for the creation of armed forces. With the deepening of the East-West conflict however, 
the military contribution of Germany to maintaining freedom in the West was soon seen as crucial. 
The United States and Britain urged Germany to reestablish armed forces while some of 
Germany’s neighbors looked with anxiety at the possibility of a rearmed Germany. With the 
memories of the role of the Wehrmacht in the atrocities of the Nazi regime still fresh, even the 
majority of the German public had great misgivings over the role of the military as an institution 
and questioned the need for an army in general.  
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was determined to firmly anchor Germany within the Western 
Alliance and, when the European Council approved the participation of a West-German 
contingent within a European Army in August 1950, he ordered an expert commission to prepare 
the framework for future German armed forces.[2] Former Wehrmacht officers met at the 
“Eifelkloster Himmerod” in early October 1950 and the “Himmeroder Denkschrift” would become 
the blueprint for Germany’s contribution to the defense of Western Europe. Later that month, 
Adenauer appointed Theodor Blank as the “Commissioner for Questions with Regard to the 
Strengthening of Allied Troops” and established the “Amt Blank” which became the forerunner of 
the German Ministry of Defense. However, not until after the German Bundestag had adopted the 
first amendment to the Basic Law, establishing Germany’s military sovereignty on February 26, 
1954, would the Amt Blank make public the first concrete plans for a German Bundeswehr.[3]  
When, in late August of 1954, the French national assembly rejected the European Defense 
Community, plans were made to integrate any national German armed forces into existing NATO 
forces.[4] In commemoration of the 200th birthday of Prussian army reformer General Gerhard 
von Scharnhorst,[5] November 12, 1955 was chosen to present the first 101 volunteers with their 
appointments to the new armed forces. Ten years after the unconditional surrender in World War 
II that led to the complete disarmament of the country, Germany was once again building up 
military forces. The first defense addendum also incorporated compulsory military service into the 
Basic Law. Just a few months after the first conscripts reported to their barracks on April 1, 1957, 
the first mechanized infantry corps and a minesweeper squadron were placed under the supreme 
command of NATO.[6]  
Gwyn Harries-Jenkins notes that “armies are not merely part of the administrative bureaucracy. 
Their claim to a monopoly of arms gives them special status which enables them to symbolize, as 
well as make effective, the distinctive identity of the state.”[7] In saying this, she echoes Samuel E. 
Finer who states that “…no other national institution so symbolizes independence, sovereignty, or 
equality with other peoples as a country’s armed forces. The first thing a nation creates is a 
national army.”[8] Thus, post-World War II Germany’s journey to independence, sovereignty, and 
equality seemed complete with the creation of the German Bundeswehr in November 1955. 
However, the formal creation of the Bundeswehr was only the start of a continuing process of 
making the armed forces an integral part of society and state. 
Innere Führung 
The role of the modern German military in society and German civil-military relations as a whole 
cannot be understood without appreciation for the concept of Innere Führung. It is a concept that 
permeates all areas of military life, designed to shape militarily efficient, democratically controlled, 
and socially integrated armed forces. Innere Führung has governed civil-military relations in 
Germany for the past 50 years. In The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington defines civil-
military relations as “the principal institutional component of military security policy” that is 
designed to “enhance the safety of the nation’s social, economic, and political institutions against 
threats arising from other independent states.”[9] Huntington stresses the need for proper 
balance between social values and military function to effectively respond to societal imperatives 
(social forces and ideologies) on one hand and functional imperatives (security threats) on the 
other.  
Military institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively 
their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military 
institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub 
of the problem of civil-military relations.[10]  
Therefore, civil-military relations describe the relationship of a nation’s armed forces with the state 
and society as a whole with the primary objective to “maximize military security at the least 
sacrifice of other social values.”[11]  
“The basic assumption of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr and of the concept of Innere 
Führung was that the democratic idea and military necessity can be harmonized with each 
other.”[12] To that end, they had to develop a framework that would “transfer the basic principles 
of a democratic state governed by the rule of law to military forces which were to be operational 
and efficient in accomplishing their tasks.”[13] Since the inception of the Bundeswehr, Innere 
Führung has aimed to achieve and maintain the proper balance of functional effectiveness on one 
hand and society’s democratic values on the other. To that end, Innere Führung pursues four 
objectives that are addressed at both the institutional level and the individual level:  
1. integration,  
2. legitimacy,  
3. motivation, and  
4. an internal order that treats soldiers like human beings.[14]  
Innere Führung at the Institutional Level 
At the institutional level, the focus of Innere Führung is on “integrating the armed forces as a 
conscription army, a parliamentary army, and an alliance army into the political system.”[15] This 
integration is imperative to achieve legitimacy. Jacques Van Doorn cites Talcott Parsons when he 
says that “institutions or formal organizations are part of a wider social system in which their role 
has to be legitimized. [Legitimacy only exists] if the value system of the organization or institution 
is recognized within the framework of the generalized values of the superordinate system.”[16] 
Van Doorn also points out that while “armed forces may be regarded primarily as the institution 
that legitimately uses physical force, …many of the problems bearing upon the legitimacy of the 
armed forces derive from doubts and criticism of their monopoly of force and military force in 
general.”[17] According to Harries-Jenkins, the military in a democracy is “legitimate only in so far 
that as its existence and its use of power has been agreed to by society as a whole. The central 
core is consent…and the individual has not merely a right but a duty to challenge the actions of 
the state.”[18]  
Innere Führung achieves this integration by applying fundamental democratic principles and a 
system of checks and balances to the management of the armed forces with the aim to dispel any 
worries that the Bundeswehr could ever become a “state within a state.” The concept not only 
supports military effectiveness but constitutes the cornerstone of civil-military relations in a 
democratic society that ensures civilian control over the military. The idea of the “citizen in 
uniform” in a conscription army, the guarantee of parliamentary control over armed forces 
operations, and the commitment of national forces to the common defense of a lasting Alliance 
with similar values contribute immensely to the legitimacy of the institution. Public support for the 
Bundeswehr and its missions and tasks has steadily climbed over the years.[19] In recent polls, 
83% of German citizens have proclaimed a positive view of the Bundeswehr, and more than two 
thirds of the population support conscription.[20]  
The term “parliamentary army” is often used when German troops are committed to operations 
abroad, as Bundestag members must approve each and every deployment by a simple majority. 
Since the mid-nineties, when a Federal Court ruling deemed out-of-area deployment of German 
armed forces compatible with the Basic Law,[21] Bundeswehr operations abroad and its actions 
as an alliance army within the framework of mutual collective security, have become common 
practice.[22] The population supports international commitments of the Bundeswehr under United 
Nations and NATO mandates, with 81% in favor of peacekeeping operations.[23] Additional 
instruments of parliamentary oversight, designed to oversee the inner structure of the armed 
forces, are the Budget and Defense Committee and the Petitions Committee within the 
Bundestag, as well as the “Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces.”[24] The 
commissioner’s mandate is to act as ombudsman for the military in order to “safeguard basic 
rights and to assist the Bundestag in exercising parliamentary control over the armed forces.”[25] 
If one defines legitimacy, as Van Doorn does, as “…the capacity of a social or political system to 
develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social order and its main solutions are 
generally appropriate,”[ 26] then Innere Führung has accomplished its objectives of integration 
and legitimization of the armed forces by providing insight and understanding, as well as the 
necessary level of consent on the institutional level. Innere Führung can thus be considered as 
the effective representation of the “public image” of the Bundeswehr in Germany.  
Innere Führung at the Individual Level 
Since the inception of the German Bundeswehr, Innere Führung has been credited with making 
considerable contributions to the integration of the soldiers into democratic society at the 
individual level as well. According to Van Doorn, 
The concept of the citizen soldier links the armed forces and society in a different way. Whereas 
the military professional is an expert, serving the nation as a specialist, the citizen soldier is an 
active member of the political community, who puts his efforts at the service of the community 
because his political rights include the right to bear arms. In this case, the way in which armed 
forces are related to society is defined and controlled by the societal environment.[27] 
By treating Innere Führung as a vehicle to guarantee soldiers basic individual rights and to apply 
constitutional principles to the internal order of the military, the concept has evolved to a 
leadership philosophy that ties professional ethics to the values of democracy, one that provides 
a “factual and moral connection between the armed forces and society at large.”[28] Innere 
Führung takes the German code of values and legal system as the basis for internal discipline 
within the armed forces and increases efficiency and professionalism in the Bundeswehr.”[29]  
In this context, the interpretation of Innere Führung as “leadership and civic education” becomes 
especially applicable. The concept of “citizen in uniform” portrays the members of the armed 
forces as free individuals, as responsible citizens, and as professional soldiers.[30] The internal 
order of the armed forces requires the respect for soldiers’ individual dignity, basic human rights, 
and the rule of law. The assumption is that only a responsible citizen will act out of his own free 
will and out of the responsibility he feels toward his community, and that the solider recognizes 
that the values of the community have to be defended even at the risk of his own life.  
Civic education as part of Innere Führung is designed to help “citizens in uniform” realize “the 
purpose and necessity of their military service for the sake of peace and freedom.”[31] Innere 
Führung places high expectations on military leaders. It stresses that the basic order of the state 
is worth protecting and defending and aims to clarify the soldier’s role in the state and society. 
Civic education emphasizes the legal, political, and ethical justification of the mission of the 
Bundeswehr and the obligation placed on citizens to render military service. Civic education 
therefore encompasses leadership doctrine, the soldier’s self-image, mission and tasks, moral-
ethical standards, organization of military duty, routine training, operational readiness, and 
command and control. Civic education also entails encouraging soldiers to actively exercise their 
civic rights, such as active and passive voting and even running for political office at all levels of 
government. As military operations involving the Bundeswehr are, as a matter of principle, 
conducted in the multinational environment, special emphasis is also given to needed social and 
intercultural skills, as well as foreign language training to facilitate multinational interoperability at 
all levels of command.  
One area of special note is the cultivation of tradition that takes into account the historical, at 
times negative, developments in the history of the German armed forces. Skeptics maintain that 
even today the German armed forces have an ambivalent connection to the heritage of the 
Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht, and some charge that the Bundeswehr has not done enough to 
distance itself from its less venerable traditions.[32] Innere Führung stresses that officers and 
NCOs alike must have an understanding of political events and must be able to place history in 
the proper context.  
There are three acknowledged lines of tradition within the German armed forces that have 
shaped today’s Bundeswehr and the soldier’s self-image.[33] The first line is the era of military 
reform in the early 19th century, predominantly marked by Prussian army reformer Scharnhorst 
who is seen as the founder of the concept “citizen in uniform.” Second, while the Wehrmacht 
during the Nazi rule itself cannot constitute a tradition for the German armed forces, it is 
nevertheless appropriate to give due respect to those who fought honorably and those who tried 
to end the at rocities and a senseless war. The third line of tradition represents the Bundeswehr 
since its inception in 1955, an army integrated into a democratic society, fundamentally different 
both in terms of its purpose and its internal structure.  
A true challenge for the concept of Innere Führung presented itself in 1990 when the Bundeswehr 
absorbed the armed forces of the former East Germany, the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), after 
the reunification of Germany. Seen as the army of the Communist party and an instrument of a 
dictatorship in the East and West alike, the integration of Communist-indoctrinated armed forces 
into the Bundeswehr seemed an insurmountable task. Yet, the ability of senior officers and 
common soldiers alike to work with each other, the commitment to the principles of Innere 
Führung in the West, and the ability to abandon, without regrets, the traditions of the NVA in the 
East and instead embrace democratic ideals, ensured the successful integration of a number of 
former NVA soldiers into the Bundeswehr.[34]  
On the individual level, the concept of Innere Führung has managed, even in times of crisis and 
turmoil, to successfully combine the image of “citizen in uniform” with an effective internal order of 
the military, thus ensuring the operational readiness of the German armed forces.  
Innere Führung—An Example to Follow 
In 1957, Samuel P. Huntington was rather skeptical about the future of the German civil-military 
relations. He saw the idea to “create a democratic army, an ideologically motivated force 
embodying subjective rather than objective civilian control” as “a reaction against the 
professionalism of the past and the product of the false identification of that professionalism with 
Hitler.”[35] Huntington foresaw “the permanent embroilment of the German military in politics” that 
would “reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new army.”[36] Instead, 50 years of German civil-
military relations based on Innere Führung have proven that this dynamic concept has been able 
to respond to developments in civil society by integrating the military into state and society, 
regardless of ruling government party. Innere Führung has successfully dealt with civil-military 
tensions and continues to provide the proper balance between military necessity and social 
values by linking the armed forces and society at large. It has taken the German code of values 
and legal system as the basis for internal discipline within the armed forces and has increased 
efficiency and professionalism in the Bundeswehr. As a new democracy in the early 1950s, 
Germany was able to take this concept and build its armed forces on the principles of civilian 
control of the military, democratic values, and the rule of law.  
Today, this concept is one example of western civil-military relations that is emulated by the 
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
NATO Partnership for Peace programs and institutions such as the National Defense University 
in Washington D.C., the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and the Center for Civil-
Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California have educated 
government officials of these countries, both civilian and military, in civil-military relations 
principles.  
As a leadership philosophy that harmonizes military requirements and constraints with democratic 
values and the rights and responsibilities of the individual, Innere Führung represents an 
excellent example of a western civil-military relations concept.  
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